XPost: linux.debian.devel.release
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Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
Tags: bookworm
X-Debbugs-Cc:
wpa@packages.debian.org
Control: affects -1 + src:wpa
User:
release.debian.org@packages.debian.org
Usertags: pu
[ Reason ]
CVE-2022-37660
[ Impact ]
security problem low
[ Tests ]
no but patch is straight forward
[ Risks ]
Low
[ Checklist ]
[X] *all* changes are documented in the d/changelog
[X] I reviewed all changes and I approve them
[X] attach debdiff against the package in (old)stable
[X] the issue is verified as fixed in unstable
[ Changes ]
Fix CVE-2022-37660: the PKEX code remains active even after a successful PKEX association. An attacker that successfully bootstrapped public keys with another entity using PKEX in the past, will be able to subvert a future bootstrapping by passively observing public keys, re-using the encrypting element Qi and subtracting it from the captured message M (X = M - Qi). This will result in the public ephemeral key X; the only element required to
subvert
the PKEX association
[ Other info ]
No
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diff -Nru wpa-2.10/debian/changelog wpa-2.10/debian/changelog
--- wpa-2.10/debian/changelog 2024-08-05 21:07:00.000000000 +0200
+++ wpa-2.10/debian/changelog 2025-04-11 16:29:46.000000000 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
+wpa (2:2.10-12+deb12u3) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS Security Team.
+ * debian/patches/CVE-2022-37660.patch: Add hostapd_dpp_pkex_clear_code()
+ and wpas_dpp_pkex_clear_code(), and clear code reusage in
+ ./src/ap/dpp_hostapd.c and ./wpa_supplicant/dpp_supplicant.c
+ * Fix CVE-2022-37660: the PKEX code remains active even after
+ a successful PKEX association. An attacker that successfully
+ bootstrapped public keys with another entity using PKEX in
+ the past, will be able to subvert a future bootstrapping by
+ passively observing public keys, re-using the encrypting
+ element Qi and subtracting it from the captured message
+ M (X = M - Qi). This will result in the public ephemeral
+ key X; the only element required to subvert the PKEX association
+
+ -- Bastien Roucariès <rouca