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from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine

What Is China Learning From Russia’s War in Ukraine?
America and Taiwan Need to Grasp—and Influence—Chinese Views of the Conflict
By David Sacks
May 16, 2022
Taiwanese soldiers on a ferry near Matsu, Taiwan, March 2022

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-16/what-china-learning-russias-war-ukraine

Beyond Europe, the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is being felt
most keenly 5,000 miles away, on the island of Taiwan. Many Taiwanese
worry that they might be the next to suffer an invasion by a more
powerful neighbor. Those fears are not unreasonable. While Ukraine and
Taiwan differ in many ways, as relatively young democracies living
alongside larger authoritarian neighbors with long-standing designs on
their territory, the two face strikingly similar strategic predicaments.

Much as Russian President Vladimir Putin has described restoring the “historical unity” between Russia and Ukraine as a kind of spiritual mission, Chinese President Xi Jinping believes that reuniting mainland
China with what he views as its lost province of Taiwan will help cement
his place in history. Xi speaks of Taiwan in much the same way Putin
talks about Ukraine, highlighting blood ties and arguing that China and
Taiwan are one family. Whereas Putin has recently challenged the
traditional understanding of state sovereignty, in order to suggest that Ukraine does not deserve it, Xi (like his predecessors) denies Taiwan’s sovereignty altogether.

These similarities notwithstanding, it would be a mistake to assume that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will in any way hasten China’s desire to achieve unification with Taiwan. Fundamentally, Chinese leaders’
calculations about whether to use force against Taiwan are political
decisions that Moscow’s actions will not influence. Moreover, Chinese officials are well aware that attacking Taiwan now would likely fuel
Western fears that Beijing and Moscow are forming an authoritarian axis
and beginning to act in concert, thereby increasing the likelihood of
direct intervention by the United States and its allies.


Nevertheless, Xi and the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) are closely monitoring events in Ukraine, looking for lessons that
might be usefully applied in the event of a conflict with Taiwan.
Russia’s struggles will in no way shake China’s determination to bring Taiwan under its control. From Beijing’s perspective, Russia’s war in Ukraine is merely a realistic preview of the costs China would likely
bear if it resorted to war. Chinese leaders will examine Russia’s
failures and adapt their operational plans to avoid making similar mistakes.

Taiwan and the United States, therefore, would be well advised to do the
same, and to scrutinize each stage of the war in Ukraine from the
perspective of a Chinese official. By doing so, they may be able to
identify facts or patterns that may already be giving Chinese officials
pause as well as capabilities that Taiwan should adopt to buttress
deterrence. Although it would be a mistake to assume that Moscow’s
actions have any direct influence on Beijing’s decisions, identifying
the kind of evidence that could convince China that Putin’s decision to attack Ukraine was a colossal strategic blunder could also help
Taiwanese and U.S. strategists deter China from a catastrophic attack on Taiwan.

A WORLD LESS TRANQUIL
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirms Chinese leaders’ belief that they
are entering a more dangerous era and that they must prepare for a
greater likelihood of war. In his call with U.S. President Joe Biden
after the war began, Xi noted that “the prevailing trend of peace and development is facing serious challenges” and that “the world is neither tranquil nor stable.” Xi’s words strongly suggest that China will
continue to increase its defense spending, which remains focused on
developing the capabilities the PLA would need to conquer Taiwan.

As the United States has built a coalition of countries, including many
of the world’s top economies, to impose severe sanctions on Russia,
China has been examining these efforts for evidence of declining U.S. influence. From Beijing’s perspective, any cracks in the coalition are heartening news, and it has certainly noted that some close U.S.
partners, such as India, have not sanctioned Russia or forcefully
condemned its invasion of Ukraine, even after reports emerged of alleged Russian war crimes. China likely assumes that global support for Taiwan
will be more muted than support for Ukraine has been, as few countries
maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and many lack even robust
unofficial relations with the island. Moreover, Russia has successfully leveraged its economic ties with some countries to keep them on the
sidelines, which has likely reassured China that its far greater
economic might will prevent many countries from supporting Taiwan.

The most important thing China has learned from war in Ukraine may be
that the U.S. will not directly intervene against a nuclear-armed opponent. China will also study the sanctions applied to Russia and take steps to decrease its own vulnerability to similar actions. As a first measure,
Beijing will accelerate its “dual circulation” strategy—seeking to promote exports while simultaneously encouraging stronger domestic
demand—in a bid to increase other countries’ economic dependence on
China and reduce its dependence on others. This strategy would serve two purposes: insulating China’s economy from sanctions and making any
sanctions that Western countries apply to Beijing to deter or punish an invasion of Taiwan hurt the West more than China. China will also
attempt to produce critical technologies such as semiconductors
domestically, reduce its reliance on the U.S. financial system and the
dollar, and support an alternative to SWIFT, the dollar-based
international payments system. Regardless of how much progress China
makes on this front, its leaders are likely confident that U.S. allies
would be far more reticent to impose wide-ranging sanctions against
China, given its centrality to global supply chains.

Potentially the most important lesson China has learned from war in
Ukraine is that the United States will not contemplate direct military intervention against a nuclear-armed opponent. Before Russia invaded
Ukraine, the United States took direct military intervention off the
table, with Biden warning that “direct confrontation between NATO and
Russia is World War III.” Chinese analysts and policymakers have likely concluded that Russia’s nuclear arsenal deterred the United States from intervening and that nuclear weapons create more room for conventional operations. Chinese strategists likely believe that this validates the country’s decision to invest heavily in increasing its nuclear arsenal,
which the U.S. Department of Defense recently estimated will reach at
least 1,000 warheads within the decade. Moreover, having witnessed
Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, China may conclude that it could deter
U.S. intervention on Taiwan’s behalf by raising its nuclear alert level
or conducting nuclear tests at the outset of a conflict.

Russia’s military blunders will help the PLA hone its plans and improve
its chances of conquering Taiwan. Russia has failed to achieve air
superiority over Ukraine; keep its forces supplied with fuel, food, and munitions; and effectively conduct combined arms operations. The PLA’s leadership was likely shocked that Russia’s military, with extensive
recent operational experience, failed to secure a decisive victory. For
the PLA, this vindicates the difficult military reforms it began in
2015, which focused on joint operations and logistics and incorporate
lessons learned from watching the United States conduct complex joint operations. At the same time, the PLA fields a significant amount of
Russian military equipment and has sought to integrate elements of
Russia’s military reforms and therefore Russia’s struggles could prompt
the PLA to question its own readiness to conduct the operations
necessary for a fight with Taiwan. This worry is likely compounded by
the fact that the PLA assumes the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense and the United States has sold Taiwan many of the same weapons
Ukraine is using to great effect. In the longer term, the PLA will
likely redouble its focus on integrating its land, sea, and air power
and improving its joint warfighting capabilities.

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ability to rally the Ukrainian people and international public opinion has shown Chinese leaders the importance of eliminating Taiwan’s political and military leadership early in a
conflict and breaking the Taiwanese people’s determination to resist. In practice, this would, at a minimum, entail attempting to assassinate
Taiwanese leaders to demoralize the population, inhibit command and
control, and prevent the emergence of a rallying figure. But China would
likely pursue even more expansive operations ahead of any assault,
including sowing divisions within Taiwanese society, spreading
disinformation, and severing Taiwan’s communications with the outside
world. China has already established essential platforms within Taiwan
for spreading pro-China messages through investments in media outlets
and recruitment of intelligence assets. It will surely continue to
refine this non-kinetic element of warfare.

HOW TAIWAN CAN PREPARE
Since China will be using Russia’s war in Ukraine as an opportunity to improve its planning for a Taiwan conflict, it is critical for Taiwan to
do the same. There are already encouraging signs. After Ukraine’s early successes against Russia, many Taiwanese took to the streets to
celebrate, and activists and commentators argued that Ukraine’s ability
to repel a militarily superior foe had inspired Taiwanese to believe
they could do the same. Taiwan’s defense minister has established a
working group to study Ukraine’s tactics and raised the prospect of
extending compulsory military service, which now has the support of over three-quarters of those polled. Interest in learning first-aid and
disaster response has surged.

But this alone is not enough. Taiwan must urgently accelerate its
adoption of an asymmetric defense strategy. It should focus on fielding
many of the same capabilities Ukraine is using to significant effect,
including portable air defense systems, drones (which Taiwan has already indicated it is prioritizing in the wake of Russia’s invasion), and
anti-tank missiles. In addition, Taiwan should ramp up anti-ship missile
and sea mine production. Its military must decentralize command and
control and develop systems to empower smaller military units to analyze
and adapt to rapidly evolving circumstances on the ground.

Taiwan must also create a more trained and ready reserve force,
establish new territorial defense forces, and more broadly plan for
mobilizing its entire society. Ordinary Ukrainians’ ability to withstand bombardment and, in many cases, take up arms has showed Taiwanese
something of the resilience they would need to demonstrate to withstand
a Chinese assault. Should China attack Taiwan, its objective would be to
rule 24 million people indefinitely, and it would be up to the Taiwanese
people to make that impossible.

A critical weakness that Taiwan must address is the difficulty of
resupplying its population and military during a conflict. Ukraine
borders NATO member states, allowing arms and humanitarian supplies into
the country even after Russia’s invasion, but supplying Taiwan in the
event of an invasion, let alone a potential blockade, will be extremely difficult. Supplying even basic goods such as food and medicine will be challenging, as commercial ships and aircraft cannot be expected to risk
the lives of their crews to continue delivering goods. Supplying
Taiwan’s military, especially if the United States were to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, would be infinitely more so.

Since China has noted Ukraine’s reliance on resupply by Western
countries, even as the war rages, China would likely prioritize cutting
off Taiwan as quickly as possible during a conflict. Taiwan should
anticipate this and prepare now by stocking reserves of munitions, oil,
food, and other critical materials and dispersing these supplies
throughout the island. In essence, everything Taiwan will need to fight
the PLA for a sustained period while keeping its population fed and
healthy enough to put up a resistance must already be on the island when
a conflict erupts.

A DETERRENT ROLE FOR THE U.S.
The United States must also hone its playbook to deter a Chinese assault against Taiwan and respond to Chinese aggression. It cannot rely on the
threat of sanctions alone to change Xi’s calculus. When the United
States publicly warned Putin of the enormous economic consequences he
would bear if he invaded Ukraine, he did so anyway. And given China’s centrality to the global economy, imposing broad sanctions on the
country will be far more difficult.

The United States should coordinate a sanctions package with its allies
and partners during peacetime and investigate ways to reduce their
economic dependence on China. The biggest weakness of the sanctions
imposed on Russia is the carveout for Russian energy, deemed necessary
(at least for the first two months of the conflict) given Europe’s
reliance on Russian oil and gas. The United States should make a
concerted effort to develop alternative sources of materials such as
rare earth minerals, which the world depends mostly on China to supply.

There is a danger that one of China’s takeaways from the conflict in
Ukraine is that the United States will be unwilling to intervene
militarily on Taiwan’s behalf. Thus, the United States needs to
introduce a policy of strategic clarity that makes explicit it would
directly come to Taiwan’s defense. Having a credible military option is essential, which will mean continuing to view Taiwan as the Department
of Defense’s pacing scenario and resourcing it accordingly. The United
States must also work more closely with Taiwan, establishing a robust
bilateral training program to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense
capabilities. It should also help Taiwan develop an asymmetric defense
strategy and prioritize weapons deliveries to the island.

The U.S. intelligence community distinguished itself during the Ukraine
crisis by revealing Putin’s moves before he made them and sharing this intelligence with U.S. allies, which deprived Putin of strategic
surprise and helped a coalition coalesce around strong sanctions and
military support. The United States should be prepared to gather and preemptively share intelligence about Chinese plans, as well. It must
act now to ensure that it has an understanding of early indicators of
PLA preparations for an attack on Taiwan and be ready to share these
indicators with its partners to plan a unified response before the war
begins.

Given the increasing alignment between Russia and China, the United
States cannot rule out that Russia would offer significant assistance to
China during a conflict over Taiwan, including arms, energy, food, and intelligence. The United States should also assume Russia would seek to distract it from any fight against China by conducting cyberattacks or
seeking to destabilize Europe. In their remarkable February 4 joint
statement that established a “no limits” friendship, China and Russia reaffirmed “their strong mutual support for the protection of their core interests,” and Russia agreed that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.” China, which has backed Russia throughout the war in Ukraine,
will expect to be repaid during a Taiwan conflict.

The steps that Washington and Taipei should take to bolster deterrence
must be carried out carefully, so as to avoid inadvertently sparking the conflict they are seeking to prevent. For starters, any stepped up
coordination with Taiwan should be done quietly and kept out of the
public eye. The United States and Taiwan should focus on how to increase Taiwan’s warfighting capabilities and eschew symbolism. Privately, the
United States should emphasize to China that these moves are consistent
with the U.S. one-China policy and are a response to the eroding balance
of power in the Taiwan Strait that is caused by China’s military
build-up. Publicly, the United States should underscore that it does not support Taiwan independence and its overriding interest is in
maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

The unfolding war in Ukraine offers important lessons for China, Taiwan,
and the United States. Whichever side adapts more deftly will do much to determine whether deterrence holds or a conflict that would
fundamentally alter the world arrives.


MORE BY DAVID SACKS

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