Excellent Insight on how China the NATO dominated West interact.the same time, if China had not taken the position of benevolent neutrality with respect to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and had not continued to buy Russian goods and provide a reliable strategic rearguard, no continuation of “
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-and-the-crisis/
"Of course, if there had not been an active rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing over the past decades, there would have been no Asian alternative to the European markets for Russian oil and gas, and nothing would have happened on February 24. At
But is China the main beneficiary of the European crisis? Is the situation developing according to the Chinese plan? For me, the answer is obviously “no.”off its path to normalizing relations with the United States, which are beneficial to Beijing for purely economic reasons. It also reduces China’s room for maneuver in Europe, which is a key market for Chinese goods. And this is in addition to the
The current development of events was not desirable for China and does not meet its interests. China itself is convinced that perhaps the only party that will now benefit is Washington—which it calls the “warmonger” (Zhang and Wan, 2022).
The imbalance of international stability allows the United States to establish new rules of the game in relations with its allies, sell them even more oil and weapons and thereby strengthen its global hegemony.
The consolidation of the “collective West,” based on the imaginary dichotomy of the “confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism” (Brands, 2018) (effectively, a “battle between Good and Evil”), harms China’s interests as it cuts
In general, the conflict has made things more difficult for China. In recent years, the country has been preparing for the fact that sooner or later its natural ambitions for the role of one of the world leaders (the concept of the “Chinese Dream”)will have to be backed by muscle-flexing (Kashin, 2015).
Economic pressure, anti-Chinese sanctions, and aggressive rhetoric from Western leaders over the past five years have simply left the Chinese no choice but to prepare for a future war, whether it is a “hybrid war” or traditional “trench warfare.However, events have moved too quickly, and now Beijing does not feel ready enough to take decisive action as Moscow did.
Moreover, China thinks that time is on its side, and Beijing’s task is to keep a neutral position for as long as possible, building up strength and hoping for a weakening of competitors.the creation of a “global NATO.” From the European security perspective, the crisis is truly becoming a global one (The Frontier Post, 2022).
Euro-Atlantic capitals also understand this and have stepped up geopolitical pressure on China. The idea of “indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region” has already appeared in their rhetoric, which actually implies
In practice, a “global NATO” is already being created, and the Madrid summit in late June testifies to that. For the first time in NATO’s history, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea were invited to attend. Measures have beenintensified to form “quasi-alliances” such as QUAD (the Quadripartite Security Dialogue of the USA, Australia, Japan, and India) and AUKUS (tripartite pact of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and, finally, Partners in the Blue Pacific (AUKUS plus
In response, China is trying to launch a network of partnerships with the island states of Oceania (Perry, 2022). However, there has been almost no success in this respect so far, and even a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, as it appears,does not involve the construction of a Chinese naval base (Ng, 2022). In other words, China has no other serious military-political partners in the Pacific except Russia (Kashin, 2019).
Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to East Asia in May has expectedly launched a new round of tensions in the region (French, 2022). Taiwan again acted as a “red rag for the bull”—a de facto independent island, whose return to a unitedChina has been a historical task of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, it should be obvious to Beijing that the situation is not confined to pressure on Russia, which has crossed the “red lines” (Ellyatt, 2022), but that there may be some clear “
China should also understand that Washington’s end goal is to systemically curb Beijing’s very ability to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.migrants, political opposition, greenhouse gas emissions, lack of democratic elections, and possible victory of a “wrong candidate” (even if such elections are introduced), and so on ad infinitum.
The pressure on China will be persisting. There is a large number of “pain points” which the so-called “world community” can complain about to the PRC: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, labor
Therefore, in fact, there is no “dilemma of choice” that Chinese experts speak of (Zuenko, 2022c). Amid Western statements that “China is a systemic threat to NATO’s interests, security and values” (Qin and Ramzy, 2022), a return to the modelof relations between the globalized “Western world” and a globalizing China, which existed until the mid-2010s, is simply impossible with Beijing’s current authorities.
They can only delay the final break as much as possible, maintaining the partnership with Russia, rebuilding the economy, building up military and political potential, and waiting for the West to swallow its own problems. As Silvio Berlusconi (2022)rightly noted in his recent essay, “Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world”; by the “world” he meant the vast “Third world” (incidentally, echoing Mao Zedong (1974)), which is increasingly
This, in fact, constitutes China’s fundamental interest amid the current crisis. "
Excellent Insight on how China the NATO dominated West interact.the same time, if China had not taken the position of benevolent neutrality with respect to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and had not continued to buy Russian goods and provide a reliable strategic rearguard, no continuation of “
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-and-the-crisis/
"Of course, if there had not been an active rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing over the past decades, there would have been no Asian alternative to the European markets for Russian oil and gas, and nothing would have happened on February 24. At
But is China the main beneficiary of the European crisis? Is the situation developing according to the Chinese plan? For me, the answer is obviously “no.”off its path to normalizing relations with the United States, which are beneficial to Beijing for purely economic reasons. It also reduces China’s room for maneuver in Europe, which is a key market for Chinese goods. And this is in addition to the
The current development of events was not desirable for China and does not meet its interests. China itself is convinced that perhaps the only party that will now benefit is Washington—which it calls the “warmonger” (Zhang and Wan, 2022).
The imbalance of international stability allows the United States to establish new rules of the game in relations with its allies, sell them even more oil and weapons and thereby strengthen its global hegemony.
The consolidation of the “collective West,” based on the imaginary dichotomy of the “confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism” (Brands, 2018) (effectively, a “battle between Good and Evil”), harms China’s interests as it cuts
In general, the conflict has made things more difficult for China. In recent years, the country has been preparing for the fact that sooner or later its natural ambitions for the role of one of the world leaders (the concept of the “Chinese Dream”)will have to be backed by muscle-flexing (Kashin, 2015).
Economic pressure, anti-Chinese sanctions, and aggressive rhetoric from Western leaders over the past five years have simply left the Chinese no choice but to prepare for a future war, whether it is a “hybrid war” or traditional “trench warfare.However, events have moved too quickly, and now Beijing does not feel ready enough to take decisive action as Moscow did.
Moreover, China thinks that time is on its side, and Beijing’s task is to keep a neutral position for as long as possible, building up strength and hoping for a weakening of competitors.the creation of a “global NATO.” From the European security perspective, the crisis is truly becoming a global one (The Frontier Post, 2022).
Euro-Atlantic capitals also understand this and have stepped up geopolitical pressure on China. The idea of “indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region” has already appeared in their rhetoric, which actually implies
In practice, a “global NATO” is already being created, and the Madrid summit in late June testifies to that. For the first time in NATO’s history, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea were invited to attend. Measures have beenintensified to form “quasi-alliances” such as QUAD (the Quadripartite Security Dialogue of the USA, Australia, Japan, and India) and AUKUS (tripartite pact of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and, finally, Partners in the Blue Pacific (AUKUS plus
In response, China is trying to launch a network of partnerships with the island states of Oceania (Perry, 2022). However, there has been almost no success in this respect so far, and even a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, as it appears,does not involve the construction of a Chinese naval base (Ng, 2022). In other words, China has no other serious military-political partners in the Pacific except Russia (Kashin, 2019).
Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to East Asia in May has expectedly launched a new round of tensions in the region (French, 2022). Taiwan again acted as a “red rag for the bull”—a de facto independent island, whose return to a unitedChina has been a historical task of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, it should be obvious to Beijing that the situation is not confined to pressure on Russia, which has crossed the “red lines” (Ellyatt, 2022), but that there may be some clear “
China should also understand that Washington’s end goal is to systemically curb Beijing’s very ability to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.migrants, political opposition, greenhouse gas emissions, lack of democratic elections, and possible victory of a “wrong candidate” (even if such elections are introduced), and so on ad infinitum.
The pressure on China will be persisting. There is a large number of “pain points” which the so-called “world community” can complain about to the PRC: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, labor
Therefore, in fact, there is no “dilemma of choice” that Chinese experts speak of (Zuenko, 2022c). Amid Western statements that “China is a systemic threat to NATO’s interests, security and values” (Qin and Ramzy, 2022), a return to the modelof relations between the globalized “Western world” and a globalizing China, which existed until the mid-2010s, is simply impossible with Beijing’s current authorities.
They can only delay the final break as much as possible, maintaining the partnership with Russia, rebuilding the economy, building up military and political potential, and waiting for the West to swallow its own problems. As Silvio Berlusconi (2022)rightly noted in his recent essay, “Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world”; by the “world” he meant the vast “Third world” (incidentally, echoing Mao Zedong (1974)), which is increasingly
This, in fact, constitutes China’s fundamental interest amid the current crisis. "
Excellent Insight on how China the NATO dominated West interact.the same time, if China had not taken the position of benevolent neutrality with respect to Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine and had not continued to buy Russian goods and provide a reliable strategic rearguard, no continuation of “
https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/china-and-the-crisis/
"Of course, if there had not been an active rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing over the past decades, there would have been no Asian alternative to the European markets for Russian oil and gas, and nothing would have happened on February 24. At
But is China the main beneficiary of the European crisis? Is the situation developing according to the Chinese plan? For me, the answer is obviously “no.”off its path to normalizing relations with the United States, which are beneficial to Beijing for purely economic reasons. It also reduces China’s room for maneuver in Europe, which is a key market for Chinese goods. And this is in addition to the
The current development of events was not desirable for China and does not meet its interests. China itself is convinced that perhaps the only party that will now benefit is Washington—which it calls the “warmonger” (Zhang and Wan, 2022).
The imbalance of international stability allows the United States to establish new rules of the game in relations with its allies, sell them even more oil and weapons and thereby strengthen its global hegemony.
The consolidation of the “collective West,” based on the imaginary dichotomy of the “confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism” (Brands, 2018) (effectively, a “battle between Good and Evil”), harms China’s interests as it cuts
In general, the conflict has made things more difficult for China. In recent years, the country has been preparing for the fact that sooner or later its natural ambitions for the role of one of the world leaders (the concept of the “Chinese Dream”)will have to be backed by muscle-flexing (Kashin, 2015).
Economic pressure, anti-Chinese sanctions, and aggressive rhetoric from Western leaders over the past five years have simply left the Chinese no choice but to prepare for a future war, whether it is a “hybrid war” or traditional “trench warfare.However, events have moved too quickly, and now Beijing does not feel ready enough to take decisive action as Moscow did.
Moreover, China thinks that time is on its side, and Beijing’s task is to keep a neutral position for as long as possible, building up strength and hoping for a weakening of competitors.the creation of a “global NATO.” From the European security perspective, the crisis is truly becoming a global one (The Frontier Post, 2022).
Euro-Atlantic capitals also understand this and have stepped up geopolitical pressure on China. The idea of “indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific region” has already appeared in their rhetoric, which actually implies
In practice, a “global NATO” is already being created, and the Madrid summit in late June testifies to that. For the first time in NATO’s history, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea were invited to attend. Measures have beenintensified to form “quasi-alliances” such as QUAD (the Quadripartite Security Dialogue of the USA, Australia, Japan, and India) and AUKUS (tripartite pact of Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and, finally, Partners in the Blue Pacific (AUKUS plus
In response, China is trying to launch a network of partnerships with the island states of Oceania (Perry, 2022). However, there has been almost no success in this respect so far, and even a security agreement with the Solomon Islands, as it appears,does not involve the construction of a Chinese naval base (Ng, 2022). In other words, China has no other serious military-political partners in the Pacific except Russia (Kashin, 2019).
Meanwhile, U.S. President Joe Biden’s visit to East Asia in May has expectedly launched a new round of tensions in the region (French, 2022). Taiwan again acted as a “red rag for the bull”—a de facto independent island, whose return to a unitedChina has been a historical task of the Chinese leadership. Therefore, it should be obvious to Beijing that the situation is not confined to pressure on Russia, which has crossed the “red lines” (Ellyatt, 2022), but that there may be some clear “
China should also understand that Washington’s end goal is to systemically curb Beijing’s very ability to exercise its sovereignty as it sees fit.migrants, political opposition, greenhouse gas emissions, lack of democratic elections, and possible victory of a “wrong candidate” (even if such elections are introduced), and so on ad infinitum.
The pressure on China will be persisting. There is a large number of “pain points” which the so-called “world community” can complain about to the PRC: Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities, labor
Therefore, in fact, there is no “dilemma of choice” that Chinese experts speak of (Zuenko, 2022c). Amid Western statements that “China is a systemic threat to NATO’s interests, security and values” (Qin and Ramzy, 2022), a return to the modelof relations between the globalized “Western world” and a globalizing China, which existed until the mid-2010s, is simply impossible with Beijing’s current authorities.
They can only delay the final break as much as possible, maintaining the partnership with Russia, rebuilding the economy, building up military and political potential, and waiting for the West to swallow its own problems. As Silvio Berlusconi (2022)rightly noted in his recent essay, “Russia is isolated from the West, but the West is isolated from the rest of the world”; by the “world” he meant the vast “Third world” (incidentally, echoing Mao Zedong (1974)), which is increasingly
This, in fact, constitutes China’s fundamental interest amid the current crisis. "
Another factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nations
in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?
On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 1:54:54 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
Another factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nationsWhen was it? Why he was slighted by nations in the SCO? And for what reason?
in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?
On Wednesday, September 21, 2022 at 6:22:10 PM UTC, stoney wrote:
On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 1:54:54 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
"Xi, Putin stated, had “concerns” about the war in Ukraine, while Xi himself never once mentionedAnother factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nationsWhen was it? Why he was slighted by nations in the SCO? And for what reason?
in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?
Ukraine. Combined with anecdotal evidence of Xi’s supposed displeasure and Russia’s public
rebukes in the SCO, some Western analysts have rapidly concluded that the Sino-Russian entente
is off." https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/sco-summit-did-not-show-what-you-think-it-showed/
Putin Mocked After Foreign Leaders Keep Him Waiting at SCO Summit https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-mocked-after-foreign-leaders-keep-him-waiting-at-sco-summit/ar-AA11WDVA
On Friday, September 23, 2022 at 12:35:57 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:broadcast it. Media presented under the control by the host and has to subject to scrutiny of their recordings where it then checked and fast explained it. But all these are irrelevant to the core issue.
On Wednesday, September 21, 2022 at 6:22:10 PM UTC, stoney wrote:
On Thursday, September 22, 2022 at 1:54:54 AM UTC+8, ltlee1 wrote:
"Xi, Putin stated, had “concerns” about the war in Ukraine, while Xi himself never once mentionedAnother factor promoted by the West to explain Putin's decision is that he was slighted by other nationsWhen was it? Why he was slighted by nations in the SCO? And for what reason?
in the SCO nations. Is this really the case?
Ukraine. Combined with anecdotal evidence of Xi’s supposed displeasure and Russia’s public
rebukes in the SCO, some Western analysts have rapidly concluded that the Sino-Russian entente
is off." https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/sco-summit-did-not-show-what-you-think-it-showed/
Putin Mocked After Foreign Leaders Keep Him Waiting at SCO Summit https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-mocked-after-foreign-leaders-keep-him-waiting-at-sco-summit/ar-AA11WDVAThe Chinese "concern" is perhaps on Russia's progress. As to the mocking, the Western media wants to use that "waiting" to humiliate Putin, instead. Seriously, the clip on his waiting should have been clipped and removed before allowing media there to
Too many within the media are too eager to portray a Putin in desperation for losing the Ukraine War as well as not supported by other powers.
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