Iran’s Hard-Liners Are Starting to Crack
By Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh, Nov. 2, 2022, WSJ

This time is different. The Iranian people have been protesting in the streets for more than a month since the morality police beat a young woman to death for reportedly failing to wear a headscarf. Now even Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s allies are
distancing themselves from the government. It’s too soon to say the elite is fracturing, but it’s clear that these divisions will widen, putting unprecedented stress on the regime.

For four decades, regime loyalists have united in times of crisis. When reformers threatened the system in the late 1990s, moderates and hard-liners worked together to crush the threat. It’s telling that today many influential conservatives display
little compunction about criticizing Mr. Khamenei and his henchmen.

Take Ali Larijani, who was the longest serving speaker of Parliament and is still one Mr. Khamenei’s advisers. He’s never been known to care about women’s rights. He’s been an ardent defender of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and
sycophantic toward Mr. Khamenei. But in a recent interview with the Iranian paper Ettela’at, he decried the rigid imposition of the hijab and insisted, “Dialogue is necessary, and it has to be substantive. We must provide the public venues for
protest and a means of conducting a dialogue.”

Jumhuriya Islami, a conservative newspaper whose first managing director was Mr. Khamenei, has also criticized the regime. A stern editorial rejected the government’s official explanation for the protests—that they are a product of foreign
interference—and stressed the seriousness of demonstrators’ grievances: “The problems of inflation, unemployment, drought, and destruction of the environment have caused people, ranging from retirees, educators and students, to protest.” The
newspaper offered a 14-point plan to defuse tensions. Point 11: “Don’t lie about what is happening.”

Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eja’i has long cultivated an image of a ruthless enforcer. And yet he is now imploring that “we must increase dialogue in the country and ensure that diverse opinions are presented in the public culture.” This
is hardly what Mr. Khamenei wants to hear from the judiciary, the linchpin of his regime’s frequent inquisitions.

Former President Hassan Rouhani, who has often kept quiet about repression if not loudly backed it, has strongly dissented from the supreme leader’s methods: “National security isn’t achieved only by recourse to military and law-enforcement means. .
. . Security must come through the protection of life and the securing of one’s livelihood, personal freedoms, and the basic rights of the people.”

Autocracies rely on terror, and it’s clear that fewer Iranians fear Tehran today. This is particularly true of young women, but Iranians from all walks of life have joined the protests. The unrest has produced strikes in critical industries, and the
security services have been hesitant to use lethal force. That conservatives are now critiquing Mr. Khamenei shows that the regime is losing its core strength. They seem to realize that Tehran can’t kill its way to success. These men either don’t
have the stomach to murder thousands of women, or they believe—rightly—that doing so would only lead to mass confrontation with hundreds of thousands of angry, relentless men.

Those inside the regime who are critical of Mr. Khamenei find themselves in a difficult position. The demonstrators aren’t interested in compromise. Dialogue was the objective of protesters in 1997, when Mohammad Khatami, a clerical reformer, became
president; even as late as 2009, when the pro-democracy Green Movement brought millions into Tehran’s streets, a compromise with the regime might have been possible. The theocracy’s brutal reactions then, and to later efforts at reform, have ended
the possibility of dialogue. Conservatives now face a choice between joining the protest or being left behind.

The scenes in Iran today are reminiscent of 1979. The monarchy’s prospects dimmed when those who benefited most from its largess hedged and then fled. Today an important segment of the Islamist elite is displaying a similar hesitancy to back the regime.
Over time it could become a majority.

The Islamic revolutionaries running Iran are made of stern stuff: They believe they’re defending God from political, if not spiritual, defenestration. But the Islamic Republic’s rulers, like the shahs before them, know that their regime ultimately
rests on haybat—the awe of unchallengeable power. That neither teenage girls throughout Iran nor foundational figures of the theocracy see this majesty any longer suggests that Mr. Khamenei’s time is running out.

Mr. Gerecht, a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-hardliners-khomeini-supreme-leader-protests-larijani-rouhani-morality-police-newspaper-chief-justice-criticism-regime-change-1979-11667410559

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* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Wednesday, November 9, 2022 at 4:27:57 PM UTC+8, David P. wrote:

Iran’s Hard-Liners Are Starting to Crack
By Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh, Nov. 2, 2022, WSJ

This time is different. The Iranian people have been protesting in the streets for more than a month since the morality police beat a young woman to death for reportedly failing to wear a headscarf. Now even Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s allies are

distancing themselves from the government. It’s too soon to say the elite is fracturing, but it’s clear that these divisions will widen, putting unprecedented stress on the regime.

For four decades, regime loyalists have united in times of crisis. When reformers threatened the system in the late 1990s, moderates and hard-liners worked together to crush the threat. It’s telling that today many influential conservatives display

little compunction about criticizing Mr. Khamenei and his henchmen.

Take Ali Larijani, who was the longest serving speaker of Parliament and is still one Mr. Khamenei’s advisers. He’s never been known to care about women’s rights. He’s been an ardent defender of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and

sycophantic toward Mr. Khamenei. But in a recent interview with the Iranian paper Ettela’at, he decried the rigid imposition of the hijab and insisted, “Dialogue is necessary, and it has to be substantive. We must provide the public venues for
protest and a means of conducting a dialogue.”

Jumhuriya Islami, a conservative newspaper whose first managing director was Mr. Khamenei, has also criticized the regime. A stern editorial rejected the government’s official explanation for the protests—that they are a product of foreign

interference—and stressed the seriousness of demonstrators’ grievances: “The problems of inflation, unemployment, drought, and destruction of the environment have caused people, ranging from retirees, educators and students, to protest.” The
newspaper offered a 14-point plan to defuse tensions. Point 11: “Don’t lie about what is happening.”

Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eja’i has long cultivated an image of a ruthless enforcer. And yet he is now imploring that “we must increase dialogue in the country and ensure that diverse opinions are presented in the public culture.” This

is hardly what Mr. Khamenei wants to hear from the judiciary, the linchpin of his regime’s frequent inquisitions.

Former President Hassan Rouhani, who has often kept quiet about repression if not loudly backed it, has strongly dissented from the supreme leader’s methods: “National security isn’t achieved only by recourse to military and law-enforcement means.

. . . Security must come through the protection of life and the securing of one’s livelihood, personal freedoms, and the basic rights of the people.”

Autocracies rely on terror, and it’s clear that fewer Iranians fear Tehran today. This is particularly true of young women, but Iranians from all walks of life have joined the protests. The unrest has produced strikes in critical industries, and the

security services have been hesitant to use lethal force. That conservatives are now critiquing Mr. Khamenei shows that the regime is losing its core strength. They seem to realize that Tehran can’t kill its way to success. These men either don’t
have the stomach to murder thousands of women, or they believe—rightly—that doing so would only lead to mass confrontation with hundreds of thousands of angry, relentless men.

Those inside the regime who are critical of Mr. Khamenei find themselves in a difficult position. The demonstrators aren’t interested in compromise. Dialogue was the objective of protesters in 1997, when Mohammad Khatami, a clerical reformer, became

president; even as late as 2009, when the pro-democracy Green Movement brought millions into Tehran’s streets, a compromise with the regime might have been possible. The theocracy’s brutal reactions then, and to later efforts at reform, have ended
the possibility of dialogue. Conservatives now face a choice between joining the protest or being left behind.

The scenes in Iran today are reminiscent of 1979. The monarchy’s prospects dimmed when those who benefited most from its largess hedged and then fled. Today an important segment of the Islamist elite is displaying a similar hesitancy to back the

regime. Over time it could become a majority.

The Islamic revolutionaries running Iran are made of stern stuff: They believe they’re defending God from political, if not spiritual, defenestration. But the Islamic Republic’s rulers, like the shahs before them, know that their regime ultimately

rests on haybat—the awe of unchallengeable power. That neither teenage girls throughout Iran nor foundational figures of the theocracy see this majesty any longer suggests that Mr. Khamenei’s time is running out.

Mr. Gerecht, a former Iranian-targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-hardliners-khomeini-supreme-leader-protests-larijani-rouhani-morality-police-newspaper-chief-justice-criticism-regime-change-1979-11667410559

Not yet to be expected. In religion matter, the silent majority in the population will determine them. Silent majority will be those majority in population in having strong views of keeping their family values under religion culture and practices, too.

Make no mistake, just let them continue to express themselves but over time, they will die down and resume their normal lives. The families will rein them in and make them turn in for their misbehaviours. In actually, the silent majority could see
something their children want and need from the govt to oblige them with something in their lives.and not freedoms per se.

Hence, a deeper study of their wants and needs in the changing demands could be identified and be quickly adjusted to meet them in order to reduce and eliminated protests and so on. Basically, social problem in society is usually arisen from feelings of
oppressions, unust justices, unfair charges, and high-handedness of their govt civil servants which comprises police and security forces and civil servants, too.

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* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)